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Reviews and Discussion

Paul Bouissac. Circus and Culture: A Semiotic Approach.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.
Reviewed by Jean Alter
University of Pennsylvania
Is drcus a form of communication? Does it offer a message on top of entertainment? Is it a language? Does it
use one or several semiotic codes which are decoded by
the audience? Is it possible to insert the circus, as a
system of signs, in the larger networ-k of signs which define our culture? Paul Bouissac answers all these questions with a resounding YES, then expands his answer in
an extraordinary collection of essays, which despite
some disparity, manage to add up to an integrated whole.
In fact, they are arranged like individual circus acts in the
circus program: each deals with a different areaacrobats, "comedy horse," jugglers and magicians, lions
and tigers, wild horses, clowns-but all have a common
message, to wit: circus must be approached semiotically.
And just as circus acts form a harmonious and stable
pattern, so the various approaches used by Bouissac
under the umbrella of semiotics complement each other
quite convincingly.
The entire book must then be judged on two levels.
Does it tell us something interesting and/or new about the
circus? And does it expand our appreciation of semiotics
as a tool for the analysis of cultural phenomena which,
like the circus, stress a public performance? There is
little doubt about the first question. Bouissac's es$ays
have been hailed as the first significant breakthrough in
what used to be only a descriptive and historical/
anecdotal account of circuses, and this general admiration is well deserved. Bouissac had the experience of
running a circus himself, as many others had; he has
been trained in linguistics, anthropology, and structuralism, as have many others; but the combination is
indeed unique. The average semiotician, when he leaves
the safe academic fields with which he is familiar, must
deal with secondhand material and, however brilliant his
presentation, always risks being countered on factual
grounds. In Bouissac's case, theory and praxis go together. As a result, no one, after reading his book, will see
circus with the same eyes as before. Of course, if one
liked the "magic" and the "wonder" of the big top, the
enlightenment provided by Bouissac will result in a feeling of loss. But the passing of the world of make-believe
is more than compensated for by an initiation to semiotic
processes underpinning the illusions. An adult can now
return to the circus in a spirit of eager exploration: to
check on Bouissac, and perhaps to add to his findings.
Since circus is a form of communication, Bouissac's
preferred model is linguistic. In any circus act, and in
complete programs, he detects the operation of the

"double articulation," i.e., the use of a finite number of
signs in a way that generates an infinite number of ~ean
ings. In that sense, circus is (or has) a language w1th
multimedia signs of a visual, auditive, and even olfactory
nature. Separately, they have no fixed meaning, but their
various combinations produce specific messages. For
example, the same acrobatic feat performed by an artist
dressed in a "brightly colored leotard" will classify him as
a superman and evoke "anxiety and admiration," ultimately referring to "survival through biological superiority," whereas performed by an artist "dressed as a tramp,"
it will provoke "laughter" and refer to "survival through
chance" (p. 19). Furthermore, like the Russian folktales
studied by Propp, circus acts and programs have a
grammar: a stable succession of stages-from the identification of the performer, through a series of tests, to
public acknowledgment of his triumph-a pattern which
may be (purposely) disturbed but eventually goes back
to its expected progression. Within this pattern, however,
performers (and/or circus owners/managers) present individual speech acts which, says Bouissac, are never the
same except by rare intentionality (p. 23). They address a
message to the audience, and the fact that it is appreciated, and hence understood, "presupposes that the receiver shares with the sender a knowledge of a system of
rules" (p. 14), i.e., a general circus code, made up of
various subcodes corresponding to types of circus signs:
linguistic, behavioral, musical, technical, along with
those involving costumes, lighting, accessories, and so
on.
While this general model raises a theoretical question
(see below), its application to concrete types of acts
yields unquestionably seminal results, though not always
of equal interest or equal faithfulness to the model. Thus
the analysis of acrobatic acts applies mainly to cybernetic concepts leading to a kinematic representation of
transformations. Bouissac follows Ashby on stable equilibrium, instability, and disturbance, and ends with formulas accounting for ways in which an acrobat creates
and corrects/controls a disturbance in his state of equilibrium: a technical notation of a rather obvious slowmotion description of the act. At this point semiotics
intervene to qualify the technical behaviors as signifiers
which (with other surrounding signifiers) relate to
signified aptitudes for survival. Hence, as mentioned
above, the real acrobat refers to biological superiority
and the clown to biological inferiority. All this seems correct, but hardly new: we always knew that we laughed at
clowns because they appeared inferior (and often flat on
the ground) and admired acrobats because they appeared superior (way up there). No need for a semiotic
approach here.

Reviews and Discussion

The essay on the performing horse is more revealing
and controversial. Bouissac says the act contains two
separate communications, each with its own code: one
between the trainer and the horse, the other between the
two performers and the audience. One may ask: does
animal training, based on the principle of a "conditioned
reflex" (p. 56), qualify as communication, and does the
stimulus, with its one-to-one automatic response, qualify
as a sign? Or even as a "signal"? Can one speak of
communication without some semiotic intentionality
and/or consciousness on both sides? If I have conditioned the horse to nod when my hand moves slightly
toward its ear, do I view my gesture as a sign which the
horse understands because we share a semiotic code, or
as a triggering step in a mechanical sequence comparable to turning the key to start a car? A well-trained horse
has no choice but to give the expected response, but
interhuman communication always entails a degree of
uncertainty as to a correct understanding and, a fortiori,
the resulting response. Of course, one may argue that
this uncertainty (this choice) only means that we have not
learned our codes well enough, that, in a perfect society,
all communication would be conditioned. Perhaps. I suspect that the study of communication, and its very notion,
would then disappear. Bouissac's description of the conditioning which goes into the horse act is fascinating, but
really belongs neither with communication nor with cultural semiotics (though perhaps with natural semiotics,
which study relations between, say, volcano smoke and
eruption, or thermometer reading and fever). On the other
hand, if that conditioning were to be assimilated to the
conditioning of an acrobat or a juggler, and the horse
viewed as a prop over which the trainer has control,
Bouissac's 'analysis of the act as communication between
the performer and the audience would still retain all its
startling pertinence: we could still receive the message
that man's superiority over animals can be reversed, especially when the horse appears to be more intelligent
than the trainer; and we could still laugh at the latter
while admiring his skill.
Not all acts however refer to biological differences.
Jugglers and magicians, according to Bouissac, subvert
the Western belief in the manual production of goods,
since prestidigitation evokes a production without any
real work, and juggling represents work without any real
production. This is why, Bouissac says, magicians produce items related to economic activity (weaving, gardening, animal breeding: handkerchiefs, flowers, rabbits)
and jugglers juggle useless objects or objects associated with the leisure class (cigar boxes, bowling
pins, billiard balls). In turn, the "cat act" (lions, tigers) is
compared to a text where the "heroes" are modified by
names, costumes, behavior patterns, and the "villains" by
their species, size, props. The text is narratively segmented by ritual bows of the tamer, and articulated by a
poetic structure, which, in its "realistic" style, works with
metonymy-i.e., danger by contiguity (as when a Iion is
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forced to jump through an ignited hoop)-and reaches
"poetry" by the means of metaphors-i.e., anthropomorphic similes (as when a lioness kisses the tamer). In still
another essay, treatment of animals in zoos and circuses
is differentiated as referring respectively to a mythical
and ritual attitude; by stressing the ritual uniqueness
through repetition, circus is said to restore the continuity
of life. The wild-horses act, through the iconization of
animals, expresses on the contrary various semantic tensions between social and antisocial behavior, freedom
and servitude, order and transgression ... and so on.
The arguments vary, but all point to a deep connection
between the message of the act and the contextual
culture.
The vitality and success of the circus, according to
Bouissac, do not lie in any "passive enjoyment" but in
these culturally determined and shared messages. This
conclusion takes us back to the theoretical question
raised by Bouissac's model. Indeed, most of his demonstrations are quite convincing, but rely almost exclusively
on what I shall call "secondary" circus signs (costumes,
music, gestures, lights, props), which accompany the
"primary" sign (technical behavior). Clowns are an exception to this rule, but then Bouissac himself views the
clowning act as quite exceptional. In most other cases,
the message is conveyed by the secondary signs. When
a dog pushes a baby carriage, he is indeed humanized
and serves to "restore a biological continuity denied by
the contextual culture" (p. 121), perhaps evoking laughter.
But the "primary" interest of the trick lies in the technical
behavior: a type of walk that dogs normally cannot perform (the humanlike erect position is only serendipitous).
The question is: what about the "primary" sign, if indeed
it is a sign? Is the technical behavior a form of communication? Does it convey a message? Or does it satisfy only
a single need, being consumed in the process? Let us
compare the enjoyment of a circus act with the enjoyment
of a gourmet meal served in a restaurant reputed for its
cuisine. Now, like the circus, gourmet meals also have a
"double articulation" at work in individual types of dishes
and the total meal: they too follow a traditional sequence
(appetizers, fish, meat, etc.) and bring variations to each
type of dish (there are no two identical Dover soles).
Furthermore, they also have secondary messages aimed
at the cultural context (from ethnic values up to patriotic
allusions and down to low comedy, as with the "cassoulet"). And then there are the right and wrong wines,
with all their literature. In that sense, gourmet meals may
and should be viewed as a form of communication to be
studied semiotically (we are applying for a grant). But, in
the primary sense, the gourmet meal remains an experience for the mouth, the eye, and the nose, appreciated for
its own sake and not for its messages. More specifically, it
is appreciated for its "quality," which means a culinary
performance whereby (skill/art overcoming difficulty) the
meal offers a positive difference from the normal meal.
Normality and appreciation of the difference are cultur-

92

studies in Visual Communication

ally determined, but the desire for the performance, and
its appreciation, appear to be universal. In fact, aren't the
same desire and appreciation at work when we pay to
applaud an acrobat, a juggler, or a lion tamer, who (art/
skill overcoming difficulty) performs acts beyond our
normal powers? In semiotic terms, any such performance, and all of them, may still be considered a sign, but
autotelic, almost totally collapsed on itself, drawing attention to its signifier-i.e., what we see, hear, or taste. The
signified only specifies that the particular signifier is indeed a performance-i.e., positively different in degree
from normality. And the referent is that performance-i.e.,
the sign, i.e., mainly the signifier. Any other referential
messages will come from the outside and through secondary signs. But then, isn't the primary sign at the center
of circus? By means of costumes, varied messages can
be grafted on the acrobatic act, which starts with the
performance; without the performance, there would be no
circus, only theater or pantomime. And again: does one
communicate a performance?
The questions raised by the circus prompt interest in
other types of public "shows" which value performances
and hence draw attention to the signifier. One could attempt to order them within that perspective. In theater, for
example, despite some stress on the performancequality of acting, beauty of a face or figure, harmony or
extravaganza of sets-the referential function of secondary signs dominates to the point that they are generally
viewed as primary, and priority is given to the text. A
one-person act, on the other hand, although it may use
referential material, is mainly appreciated for the
performance-not for the content of jokes but for the
manner of their telling. The circus operates like a manypeople show: it stresses the performance but also conveys messages. Bouissac's book shows that these are
subtle and concerted, and powerfully grounded in our
culture. I am not sure, however, whether they really account for the success of the circus, or whether they play
second fiddle to the sheer enjoyment of the performance.

Michael Greenhalgh and Vincent Megaw, eds. Art in
Society: Studies in Style, Culture, and Aesthetics. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, xiii + 350 pp. (cloth).
Reviewed by Marie ·Jeanne (Monni) Adams
Harvard University
As befits a pub Iication on art this is a handsome book,
with an attractive print layout, sprinkled with photographs, drawings, and graphs, firmly bound, and appropriately heavy but compact in the hand. How it weighs in
as a contribution to the subject cannot be stated as a
simple sum of its parts, for a few brilliant sections outweigh the whole.
The title sweeps across a wide intellectual horizon, but
in fact the twenty-two essays stay neatly within the
bounds of art studied by anthropologists; that is, they
concentrate on small-scale societies, living , dead , or dying. The contributions stem from a symposium on art and
society, sponsored by the editors, held at Leicester University in early 1975, with the addition of three papers, all
but one drawn from Brit!sh backgrounds.
Few anthropologists focus their primary effort on visual
art in the same way they might on ritual or oral tradition ,
and fewer art historians concentrate on the art of exotic
peoples. The result is that ethnoart is a bit of everybody's
business, and the inevitable resulting miscellany shows
up clearly in this kind of book, which lacks a specific
theme or regional focus and includes a philosopher, art
historians, archaeologists, social anthropologists,
museum ethnographers, and practicing artists who are
teachers or collectors.
The resulting range of viewpoints and topics may give
this book, as the cover claims, a wide appeal, but their
juxtaposition and the ensuing seesawing quality can induce vertigo even in a tolerant reader. The extremes in
levels of expression and research caliber that characterize this compendium are illustrated by the first two
selections. Philosopher of aesthetics Richard Wollheim
offers a worthy if obscurely abstract admonition that
gleams with fashionable terms as he dismisses the
taxonomic or distinctive feature approach in favor of the
"generative," for the proper analysis of art works. This is
followed by the trivial statements of Michael Cardew, the
potter who served as a craft development teacher in
Nigeria, to the effect that pre! iterate art is comparable to
the art of children and that "others" do not have our habit
of conceptual thinking. The entire first section, with nine
essays on appreciation and aesthetics-none longer
than five pages-resembles a slightly awry Hungarian
cake with several dark tasty layers interspersed with light,
airy ones. The remaining longer articles are loosely
grouped under two headings: Methodology and Stylistic
Analysis (six pieces) and Some Ethnographic Samples

